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This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core
correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which
mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show
that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically when
faced with this mechanism. We also provide a second mechanism to implement the
core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Litera-
ture Classification Numbers: C78, D78.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we introduce two mechanisms that implement the stable
correspondence in a college admissions problem. These are stylized ver-
sions of contractual processes in bilateral markets where monetary transfers
either are irrelevant or can be embodied on agents’ preferences.
*We thank Jabier Arin, Salvador Barbera`, Luis Corcho´n, Carmen Herrero, In˜igo Iturbe-
Ormaetxe, Matthew O. Jackson, Martin Peitz, Socorro Puy, Tayfun So¨nmez, and an asso-
ciate editor for their comments. Alcalde’s work is partially supported by the Institut Valencia`
d’Investigacions Econo`miques and DGICYT under project PB 97–0131. Romero–Medina ac-
knowledges financial support from the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales and DGICYT under
project PB 92–0590.
294
0899-8256/00 $35.00
Copyright © 2000 by Academic Press
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
1
Matching markets have been extensively analyzed from a game-
theoretical point of view (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a detailed
state of the art until 1990). In this framework, Roth (1982) and Alcalde and
Barbera` (1994) have shown the existence of incentives for agents to misre-
port their true preferences. These incentives appear when agents are faced
with some mechanisms selecting allocations that satisfy certain “desired”
properties. These results give us a reason to study the implementability of
stable solutions for the college admissions problem.
Core correspondence implementability in college admissions problems
was first approached by Kara and So¨nmez (1997). They showed that the
core correspondence can be implemented in Nash equilibrium. However,
they do not provide a simple mechanism that can be used in real-life
situations. They also show that no subselection of the core is Nash im-
plementable. There are two problems that are still open in the college
admissions problems framework. The first one is the design of natural
mechanisms to solve the implementability of the core, and the second one is
the analysis of implementability of core subselections. This paper provides
positive answers to both of them.
Alcalde (1996) studied both questions for a particular case of matching
problems, the marriage market problem. He provides some positive answers
to the implementation problem, using simple mechanisms. In particular, he
implements the core correspondence. He also provides a mechanism to
implement the extreme points in the core correspondence.
A way to deal with the problem is to analyze simple real-life mechanisms.
Romero–Medina (1998) studies the mechanism employed by the Spanish
university system to allocate new students to colleges. He shows that this
mechanism can select unstable outcomes, while core allocations would be
reached when students behave strategically. This result cannot be applied to
the more general framework in which we are interested, since the matching
procedure studied in Romero-Medina (1998) does not allow universities to
behave strategically.
Let us now introduce the mechanism that implements the core corre-
spondence in bilateral matching markets. It is a procedure in which agents
take decisions sequentially. In the first stage, students simultaneously send
an application form to no more than one college. In the second stage, each
college selects its best set of students from among the applicants. Colleges’
decisions determine the matching which results from agents’ interaction.
Thus, the mechanism to be analyzed captures essential aspects which hold
in real-life college admissions problems. First, we model sequential inter-
actions among agents on both sides of the market, reflecting an adjustment
process to reach stable allocations. Second, agents on one side of the mar-
ket (students) adopt an “active” role, making offers, whereas the aptitude
shown by agents on the other side (colleges) can be considered as “passive”:
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they only accept or reject the offers they receive. In fact, the mechanisms
analyzed below reflect the idea of the classical algorithm developed by Gale
and Shapley (1962).
Since our mechanism reflects a sequential decision process, the first equi-
librium concept we study is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPE).
Therefore, our results cannot be seen as a consequence of those obtained
by Kara and So¨nmez (1997). We are also interested in analyzing the ef-
fects of the agents’ commitments when selecting the strategies to be played.
Thus, we also analyze the outcomes that can be expected when agents se-
lect strategies that constitute a Strong Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SSPE) for this game, that is, strategies that are not only a SPE but also
a Strong Nash Equilibrium for this mechanism. Under such an equilibrium
concept, this mechanism selects the students’ optimal stable matching. This
matching is the (unique) matching weakly preferred by every student to any
other stable matching.
Notice that the main feature of the mechanisms that we present in this
paper is that they constitute reasonable proposals for effective design. Fol-
lowing Jackson (1992), the mechanisms used to implement social choice
correspondences should have “natural” features. Applicability to real-life
situations can be one of these features. The mechanism we present in this
paper satisfies this requirement, and furthermore it is traditionally used in
many real-life situations. There are two main reasons for this: first, it is
straightforward to obtain the message space of each agent from its own
preferences. Second, any individual is able to evaluate the consequences of
her strategy without using a sophisticated analysis of the mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
basic model. Section 3 presents and analyzes the mechanism, to be called
“the students-propose-and-colleges-choose” mechanism. Section 4 studies
the effects of an interchange in agents’ roles in the mechanism introduced
in Section 3. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2. THE MODEL
Consider a college admission problem with n colleges and m students.
Let C = c1; : : : ; cn and S = s1; : : : ; sm be the sets of colleges and
students, respectively. Each college has preferences, Pc; of sets of stu-
dents. Pc is assumed to be a linear order on 2S . Each student’s pref-
erences, Ps; is described by a linear order on C ∪ s: A college ad-
missions problem is fully described by a triplet C; Sy P
ö
, where P
ö
=
Pc1; : : : ; Pcn; Ps1; : : : ; Psm is a list containing a full description
of the agents’ preferences and is called a profile.
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An allocation for such a problem, or matching, is a mapping µ from C ∪ S
into 2S ∪ C satisfying
(i) For all c ∈ C, µc ∈ 2S .
(ii) For all s ∈ S, µs ∈ C ∪ s.
(iii) For each pair c; s ∈ C × S, µs = c ⇐⇒ s ∈ µc.
From now on we will consider C and S to be fixed sets. Thus we can
identify a college admissions problem C; Sy P
ö
 with the preference profile
P
ö
.1 Let ℳ be the set of all possible matchings µ. Finally, 
ö
denotes the
set of (potential) matching markets.
Let P
ö
be a matching market. Given a set of students A ⊆ S, we denote
by ChcA the maximal element on 2
A under the linear order Pc.
Definition 2.1. A matching µ is said to be individually rational for
P
ö
iff
(i) Chcµc = µc for all c ∈ C:
(ii) For all s ∈ S, c ∈ C sPsc H⇒ s /∈ µc:
Definition 2.2. Let µ be a matching for P
ö
. We say that µ is blocked
by a pair c; s ∈ C × S iff
(i) cPs µs.
(ii) s ∈ Chcµc ∪ s:
A pair c; s which satisfies the above two conditions is called a blocking
pair for µ.
Definition 2.3. Let µ be a matching for P
ö
. We say that µ is (pairwise)
stable if it is individually rational and there is no pair blocking it. Let N P
ö

denote the set of stable allocations for the problem P
ö
.
Finally, we assume that colleges’ preferences, regarding groups of stu-
dents, are substitutive. That is, for any two students s 6= s′, if s belongs to
ChcA, then she will also belong to ChcA \ s
′. This is an usual as-
sumption in the related literature, and it guarantees nonemptiness of the
set of stable allocations (see Theorem 6.5 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990)).
Notice that when colleges’ preferences are substitutive, the set of (pair-
wise) stable allocations coincides with the core of that college admissions
problem.2 That is, given a stable allocation, no group of agents can find a
1For the sake of simplicity, we use the same notation for a preference profile and for the
related college admissions problem. The context will precise if P
ö
denotes a matching problem
or simply a preference profile.
2Proposition 6.4 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) establishes that stability and pairwise sta-
bility are equivalent concepts in college admissions problems with substitutive preferences.
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matching to improve the utility of all of its members without being matched
with agents outside this group. Furthermore, if colleges’ preferences satisfy
substitutability, the set of stable allocations has a latticial structure. This
property guarantees (i) the existence of a unique stable allocation which
is Pareto optimal from the point of view of students and (ii) the existence
of a unique allocation which is Pareto optimal from the point of view of
colleges (when restricted to the set of stable matchings).
The concept of implementation used throughout the paper is well known
in the literature. We next formalize this concept for both the Subgame Per-
fect Nash Equilibrium (SPE) and the Strong Subgame Perfect Nash Equi-
librium (SSPE) cases. Let ℰk be the set of strategies for agent k, and let
ℰ =×x∈C∪S ℰx be the set of strategy profiles. Associated with each strategy
profile e˜ ∈ ℰ we can define a message profile me˜, or simply m˜, which de-
scribes the action taken by each individual, given the strategy they choose.
A matching mechanism is described by the set of strategies available to
each agent and an outcome function γ that assigns a matching to each pro-
file of messages. We say that a matching mechanism implements a solution
concept, say χ, in (Strong) Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium if (i) for any
e˜, (Strong) Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game Ŵ x= C; Sy P
ö
yγ,
γme˜ belongs to χP
ö
, and (ii) for each µ in χP
ö
 there exists a
(Strong) SPE for Ŵ, say e˜′, such that γme˜′ = µ.
3. THE “STUDENTS-PROPOSE-AND-COLLEGES-
CHOOSE” MECHANISM
This section is devoted to analyzing a matching mechanism that mimics
real-life matching procedures. In the mechanism we propose, each student
selects the college at which she wants to study. Then, once each college
had received all of its application forms, it accepts its most preferred set of
students.
Let us introduce the mechanism, which we are going to call the students-
propose-and-colleges-choose mechanism. This is a two-stage game. In the
first stage, students have to decide. Each student’s message space coincides
with the set of colleges and her being unmatched, C ∪ s. In the second
stage colleges, knowing students’ messages, select the set of students that
they want to admit. Thus, each college’s message space coincides with 2S .
Let mk denote the message of agent k ∈ C ∪ S, and let m˜ be an ordered
vector containing the messages of all of the agents.
The outcome function, denoted by 8SC , selects a matching which is de-
fined as follows: 8SCm˜ = µm˜, where for any s in S,
µm˜s =
{
ms if s ∈ mms
s otherwise,
5
and, for each c in C,
µm˜c = s ∈ mc  c = ms:
Theorem 3.1. The “students-propose-and-colleges-choose” mechanism
implements in SPE the core correspondence of college admissions problems.
Proof. First, we show that every SPE outcome is a stable matching rel-
ative to agents’ preferences. Let m˜′ be a SPE for ŴSC x= C; Sy P
ö
y8SC.
One can check that, at the second stage, each college has a dominant strat-
egy, namely, m′c = Chcs ∈ S  c = m
′s.3 Thus, 8SCm˜′ should be
an individually rational matching for P
ö
.
Let us suppose that 8SCm˜′ is not in N P
ö
; then there should be a
blocking pair, say c; s, in C × S. Since all of the students play simulta-
neously, this cannot be the case, because student s can reach higher utility
by playing m′′s = c. Notice that, in the second stage, c’s message has to
contain such a student, a contradiction.
On the other hand, let µ be a stable matching for P
ö
. Let us consider
the following strategies for the agents. Each student message (and strategy)
is ms = µs. In the second stage any college’s strategy is its dominant
strategy, its message being mc = µc. This constitutes a SPE for the
related game whose outcome coincides with µ, which yields the desired
result.
Since the Social Choice Correspondence that we study is the core, we
analyze the influence of agents’ behavior on the expected outcome when
commitment is allowed. In such a case Strong Subgame Nash Equilibrium
seems to be a minimum requirement to be fulfilled by our predictions. The
analysis of such an equilibrium concept is the aim of Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2. The “students-propose-and-colleges-choose” mechanism
implements in SSPE the students optimal stable allocation.
Proof. First, we are going to show that the students’ optimal stable
matching can be supported by a SSPE. Let P
ö
be a matching market, and let
µS be its students’ optimal stable allocation. Consider the following strate-
gies: for any s in S, ms = µSs, and, for each c in C, mc = argmax Pc
on s ∈ S s.t. c = ms. It is straightforward to see that these strategies
constitute a SSPE whose outcome is µS .
3Notice that such a strategy is not its unique best response. In fact, a necessary and sufficient
condition for mc to be a college c’s best response to students’ strategies, ms, is to satisfy
mc ∩ s ∈ S  c = ms = Chcs ∈ S  c = m
′s. Nevertheless, all of these messages are
strategically equivalent. Since we are interested in equilibrium payoffs rather than equilibrium
strategies, we do not pay attention to these strategies.
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On the other hand, let m˜′ be a SSPE yielding µ 6= µS as the outcome. We
will show that it is not possible. Notice that every SSPE is a SPE. Thus, by
Theorem 3.1, µ has to be stable. Let denote S′ x= s ∈ Sx µSsPsµs
the set of students preferring their allocation under µS rather than under
µ. Since µ 6= µS , S′ is nonempty. Now consider the following strategies:
every s in S′ plays m′′s = µSs, and any s in S\S′ plays m′s. Following
the lattice structure of the core, it holds that m′s = µSs for all s not
in S′. Given that colleges play their dominant strategies (see the proof of
Theorem 3.1 above), the outcome when agents in S′ shift their strategy and
play m′′s is µS , a contradiction.
4. THE “COLLEGES-PROPOSE-AND-STUDENTS-
CHOOSE” MECHANISM
This section introduces a mechanism implementing the core correspon-
dence of college admissions problems. The idea underlying this mechanism
is very similar to the one analyzed in Section 3. In this case offers are made
by colleges, and each student selects her “best college” from the proposals
she receives. That is, the main formal difference between this mechanism
and the one studied in Section 3 is that we shift the order in which agents
on both sides of the market make their decisions.
A formal description of the mechanism, named “the colleges-propose-
and-students-choose” mechanism, follows. It is a two-stage game. In the
first stage, colleges have to decide simultaneously. Each college message
space coincides with the set of potential teams of students, 2S . In the sec-
ond stage, students, knowing colleges’ messages, select simultaneously the
college in which they want to study. Thus, each student message space co-
incides with C ∪ s. Let mk denote the message by agent k ∈ C ∪ S, and
let m˜ be an ordered vector containing agents’ messages.
The outcome function, denoted by 8CS , selects a matching which is de-
fined as follows: 8CSm˜ = µm˜, where for any s in S,
µm˜s =
{
ms if s ∈ mms
s otherwise;
and, for each c in C,
µm˜c = s ∈ mc  c = ms:
The next result analyzes the equilibria outcomes of this mechanism when
no commitment by agents is allowed. In some sense, the result can be
interpreted as an equivalence between this mechanism and the “students-
propose-and-colleges-choose” mechanism. The proof for Theorem 4.1 is
omitted, but it can be constructed in a way similar to that of Theorem 3.1.
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Theorem 4.1. The mechanism described above implements in SPE the
core correspondence.
The relationship found between the mechanisms studied in Theorems
3.1 and 4.1 does not hold when agents are allowed to commit on deciding
which strategies have to be played. As Example 4.2 shows, cooperation
among agents does not necessarily reduce the set of possible outcomes.
Example 4.2. Let us consider the following five students and three col-
leges market:
Ps1 = c1 Pc1 = s1s2s3s4s5
Ps2 = c3c1c2 Pc2 = s2s3s4s5s1s2s3s4s5
Ps3 = c3c1c2 Pc3 = s4s5s2s3s1s2s3s4s5
Ps4 = c2c1c3
Ps5 = c2c1c3
It is straightforward to see that there is a Strong Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium yielding each stable matching. For instance, the matching µS
in which µSc1 = s1, µ
Sc2 = s4s5 and µ
Sc3 = s2s3 can be supported
in SSPE by strategies mc1 = s1s2s3s4s5, mc2 = s4s5, mc3 = s2s3
and, for each student s, ms = argmax Ps on c ∈ C s.t. s ∈ mc ∪
s. In a similar way, we can support the colleges’ optimal stable matching
µC in which µCc1 = s1, µ
Cc2 = s2s3 and µ
Sc3 = s4s5 by a SSPE
described by strategies mc1 = s1, mc2 = s2s3, mc3 = s4s5 and, for
each student s, ms = argmax Ps on c ∈ C s.t. s ∈ mc ∪ s.
5. FINAL REMARKS
This paper introduces two mechanisms implementing the core correspon-
dence of matching markets. The results solve two essential questions. First,
the core of such games can be implemented in Subgame Perfect Equilib-
rium. And second, it provides simple mechanisms for implementing such a
solution concept.
The first mechanism that we introduce implements a particular selection
of the core, namely the students’ optimal stable matching. Thus, this paper
also provides a positive answer to the implementability of a selection of the
core in matching markets. Notice that Kara and So¨nmez (1997) prove that
no selection of the core can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium.
Unfortunately a symmetric result cannot be provided for the set of col-
leges. This result points out (as Roth (1985) did) the asymmetry holding
among both sides of the market. Moreover, we can also state, in the words
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of Roth, that “the college admissions problem is not equivalent to the mar-
riage problem.” Note that, in the particular case of marriage markets (col-
leges have only one position each), a symmetrical result for Theorem 4.1
can be stated by exchanging the role of students and colleges.
To conclude, we want to mention that Alcalde, et al. (1998) analyzed
two mechanisms for job matching markets that were inspired by the mech-
anisms used in this paper. They show that, under some conditions, the
results presented in this paper can be extended to the case in which mon-
etary transfers play an essential role. Nevertheless, as the reader can see,
the mathematical tools employed in the two papers are very different. So,
even if the results of the two papers have interpretative similarities, neither
can be considered a particular case of the other.
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